The paper discusses community enforcement in in…nitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a …xed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, ef…ciency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players'beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures are allowed or players have unit discount rates. These equilibria satisfy numerous robustness properties.
Introduction
In many strategic environments, interaction is local and segmented. Competing neighborhood stores by and large serve di¤erent yet overlapping sets of customers, the behavior of the residents of an apartment block a¤ects their contiguous neighbors to a larger extent than neighbors in a di¤erent block, a nation's foreign or domestic policy typically generates larger externalities for neighboring nations than for remote ones. One classic case is the private provision of local public goods in which the strategic interaction is modelled using either a prisoner's dilemma or by a hawk-dove game. For example, many forms of anti-social behavior are generally captured by the former whereas investments in common security, infrastructure or maintenance that yield bene…ts only when a …xed cut-o¤ level is reached by the latter. In addition to local interaction, one notable feature of these environments is uncertain monitoring: whereas participants are aware of their own neighbors'identities and actions, they are not necessarily aware of the identity and actions of their neighbors'neighbors.
Within these strategic environments, it is of particular interest to study long run interaction, when incentives can only be provided locally in a decentralized manner. Our objective is to analyze such interaction within a repeated game framework that di¤ers from the standard one by allowing actions to be observed only locally. Such framework, despite its plainness and its potential applications, has not yet produced signi…cant results in the literature. A natural question that we will address is whether local community enforcement su¢ ces to generate e¢ cient behavior. The main obstacle to sustaining cooperation is that information about individuals'past behavior in a relationship is local: it is common knowledge within the relationship, but is not necessarily available to outsiders. The absence of publicly observable histories implies that punishment are no longer based on "simultaneous"coordination: by punishing a neighbor's deviation, a player can trigger subsequent punishments from di¤erent neighbors, who were not related to the original defector and were thus unable to observe the initial deviation. Thus, if a shop ceases to collude in order to punish defections by a neighboring competitor, it will a¤ect the behavior of other neighboring shops that were not a¤ected by the …rst defection. Moreover, as such defections spread through neighborhoods, they might return to one of the players who was either a source of such defection or had retaliated to it, and enter cycles. Naturally, in these circumstances the construction of equilibrium incentives for cooperative behavior and the derivation of equilibrium beliefs is a challenging task.
Summary
We study in…nitely repeated two-action games. The setup consists of a …nite number of players who choose in every period whether to cooperate or defect. A graph that represents the monitoring structure, the information network, is realized at the beginning of the game. Each player is privately informed of his neighborhood, namely the subset of players with whom he will interact in bilateral relationships for an in…nite number of periods, but receives no information as to other players'neighborhoods. A player observes only the actions played by his neighbors and, crucially, cannot discriminate among them by choosing di¤erent actions. That is, in every period a player chooses one action that applies to all bilateral relationships in his neighborhood. All the players play the same game in all neighborhoods.
We show that, for su¢ ciently high discount rates and any beliefs with full support about the monitoring structure, sequential equilibria exist in which the e¢ cient stagegame outcome is played in every period. It should be noted that standard results do not apply because bilateral enforcement may not be incentive compatible when punishments in one relationship a¤ect outcomes in all the others. For instance, punishing a neighbor inde…nitely with a grim trigger strategy is not viable if cooperation in other relationships is disrupted, and modi…cations as in Ellison (1994) work only for particular speci…cations of payo¤s. Indeed, equilibrium strategies will be such that, after any history, players' believe that cooperation will eventually resume.
Our proofs are constructive, and exploit simple bounded-punishment strategies which are robust with respect to the players'priors about the monitoring structure. In particular, in the equilibria characterized only local information matters to determine players' behavior. E¢ ciency is supported by strategies that respond to defections with further defections. When the players'discount rate is smaller than one, the main di¢ culty in the construction of sequentially rational strategies that support e¢ ciency is the preservation of short-run incentive compatibility after some particular histories of play. When defections spread through a network, two complications arise. The …rst occurs when a player expects future defection coming from a particular direction. Suppose that somewhere in a cycle, for example, a defection has occurred and reaches a player from one direction. If this player does not respond, he may expect future defections from the opposite direction caused by players who are themselves responding to the original defection. This player's short term incentives then depend on the timing and on the number of future defections that he expects. In such cases, the veri…cation of sequential rationality and the calculation of consistent beliefs can be extremely demanding. We will circumvent this di¢ culty via the construction of consistent beliefs such that a player never expects future defections to reach him. Such beliefs are generated trivially when priors assign positive probability only to acyclic monitoring structures. More importantly, as we shall see, such beliefs can also be generated when priors have full support. The second complication arises when a player has failed to respond to a large number of defections. On the one hand, matching the number of defections of the opponent in the future may not be incentive compatible, say when this player is currently achieving e¢ cient payo¤s with a large number of di¤erent neighbors. The restriction that a player's action is common to all neighbors is of course the main source of complications here. On the other hand, not matching them may give rise to the circumstances outlined in the …rst type of complications, that is, this player may then expect future defections from a di¤erent direction. The former hurdle will be circumvented by bounding the length of punishments and the latter, as before, by constructing appropriate consistent beliefs.
The above di¢ culties do not arise when players are patient as short-term incentives are irrelevant and punishments need not be bounded. Indeed, stronger results are obtained for the case of limit discounting in which payo¤s are evaluated according to Banach-Mazur limits. We will show that e¢ ciency is resilient to histories of defections. In particular, there exists a sequential equilibrium such that, after any …nite sequence of defections, paths eventually converge to the constant play of e¢ cient actions in all neighborhoods in every future period. An essential part of the construction is that in any relationship in which defections have occurred the number of periods in which the ine¢ cient actions are played is "balanced": as the game unfolds from any history, both players will have played the ine¢ cient action an equal number of times before resuming the e¢ cient play. Remarkably, such balanced retaliations eventually extinguish themselves and always allow the resumption of cooperation throughout the network.
Although our formal analysis will be restricted to uniform discount rates and symmetric stage games with deterministic payo¤s, the equilibria characterized are robust with respect to heterogeneity in payo¤s and discount rates, and with respect to uncertainty in payo¤s and population size, as long as the ordinal properties of the stage games are maintained across the players. The above equilibria will obviously persist as babbling equilibria in setups with communication. In addition, these equilibria can be easily modi…ed to accommodate monitoring structures in which players interact with fewer players than they observe. Section 2 presents the setup and de…nes the relevant equilibrium properties. Section 3 considers games in which players are arbitrarily patient and proves the existence of cooperative equilibria. Such equilibria are shown to be independent of the players'beliefs on the monitoring structure, and to satisfy a desirable notion of stability and several other robustness properties. Section 4 considers games with impatient players and shows how cooperation can be achieved when prior beliefs have full support. The …rst part of the appendix shows that results trivially extend to games in which only acyclic monitoring structures are possible. All the proofs omitted from the main text appear in the second part of the appendix.
Related Literature
This paper …ts within the literature on community enforcement in repeated games. A major strand pioneered by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) has focussed on environments with random matching of players and shown that e¢ cient allocations can be sustained as equilibria when players become arbitrarily patient. Subsequent contributions include Takahashi (2008) and Deb (2011) . In our model, matching is not random but determined at the beginning of the game and …xed throughout the play.
A large, growing literature investigates community enforcement in environments in which players interact with and monitor di¤erent subsets of other players under a variety of di¤erent modelling assumptions. The advantage of our framework is that it does not rely on neighbor-speci…c punishments, communication, or knowledge of the global monitoring structure. Some notable studies allow players to choose neighbor speci…c actions, such Our framework is closely related to several works which, unlike our model, postulates no uncertainty about the monitoring structure. Ben Porath and Kahneman (1996) establish a sequentially rational Folk Theorem for general stage game payo¤s when each player is observed by at least two other players, and when public communication and public randomization are allowed. Renault and Tomala (1998) establish a Nash Folk Theorem for special monitoring structures (in which the subgraphs obtained by suppressing any one player are still connected), general stage game payo¤s, no discounting, and no explicit communication. Haag and Laguno¤ (2006) consider games with prisoner's dilemma interactions and heterogeneous discount rates, and show for which monitoring structures cooperation can be sustained by local trigger strategies. Xue (2004) and Cho (2010 Cho ( & 2011 also focus on the prisoner's dilemma. Cho (2010) considers acyclical networks and allows neighbors to communicate. Cho (2011) shows the existence of sequential equilibria in which players cooperate in every period and in which cooperation eventually resumes after deviations if public randomization is allowed. Xue (2004) restricts the analysis to linear networks.
Wolitzky (2012) investigates a setup similar to ours with uncertainty about the moni-toring structure, and characterizes the maximal level of cooperation that can be enforced for …xed discount rates in a local public goods game with compact action sets. Unlike our model, the monitoring structure changes every period and is learned at the end of each period. This feature of the model plays an essential role in the equilibrium construction, and prevents any of his results to apply to our framework.
One signi…cant point of departure of our paper from the above literature is the construction of equilibrium strategies. In particular, reciprocity will play a crucial role in the characterization of sequentially rational behavior. Our equilibria are somewhat evocative of the "trading favors" equilibria in Möbius (2001) and Hauser and Hopenhayn (2004) , despite the frameworks bearing little resemblance. Notably, our players can be viewed "trading"punishment o¤ the equilibrium path.
Setup And Equilibrium Properties
We …rst introduce the setup and the information structure. Then, we proceed to de…ne the solution concept and equilibrium properties.
The Stage Game
Consider a game, the stage game, played by a set N of n players in which any player i interacts with a subset of players N i N nfig of size n i , which we call the neighborhood of player i. We assume that j 2 N i if and only if i 2 N j . This structure of interaction de…nes an undirected graph (N; G) in which ij 2 G if and only if j 2 N i . We shall refer to G as the information network. De…ne a path to be an m tuple of players (j 1 ; ::; ; j m ) such that j k+1 2 N j k , k = 1; 2:::; m 1. If j m = j 1 , a path is a cycle. Given a neighborhood N i for player i, let (N i ) be the set of information networks in which player i's neighborhood is N i .
Players are privately informed about their neighborhood. The beliefs of player i regarding the information network, conditional upon observing his neighborhood, are derived from common prior beliefs f over the set of information networks. 1 We say that a prior f is admissible if, for any i 2 N and M N nfig, f (G) > 0 for some G for which N i = M . Admissibility ensures that posterior beliefs are well de…ned for any realization of the information network. We assume throughout the paper that priors are admissible. The set of admissible priors is denoted by A .
The set of actions of player i is A i and consists of only two actions labeled C and D. We will refer to action C as cooperation and to action D as defection. A player must choose the same action for all his neighbors. That is, a player cannot discriminate across neighbors and his action must be played in his entire neighborhood. Given a subset M of players, let A M denote j2M A j and a M an element of A M . We will often use i to denote N nfig. The payo¤ of any player is separable across relationships. Let ij de…ne the emphasis of player i in the relationship with player j. The stage game payo¤ of player
where u ij (a i ; a j ), the payo¤ of player i in the relationship ij 2 G, is given by
For ease of notation, we assume that ij > 0 for any ij in G. Note that, if ij = 0 for ij 2 G, player i observes the actions of player j but his payo¤ is not a¤ected. All our results extend to the case in which some ij 's are equal to zero for ij 2 G.
We adopt the convention that payo¤s are equal to zero when N i is empty. For simplicity, the above payo¤ matrix is common to all bilateral relationships. We will clarify along the analysis when this assumption can be dispensed with.
We restrict attention to stage games payo¤s for which mutual cooperation is e¢ cient. We will also assume that defection is a best response when the opponent cooperates to rule out the trivial case in which mutual cooperation is an equilibrium of the stage game. Such restrictions amount to the following assumption, which will be maintained throughout.
Payo¤s are common knowledge. After the main results, we will discuss the extent to which this assumption is necessary. Naturally, if l > 0, the stage game has a unique Bayes Nash equilibrium in which all players play D. If instead l < 0, the stage game always possesses a mixed strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium. 2 
The Repetition
The players play the in…nite repetition of the stage game. The information network is realized prior to the beginning of play and remains constant thereafter. In every period, a player observes only the past play of his neighbors. The set of possible histories for player i 2 N whose realized neighborhood is N i is de…ned as
where ; denotes the empty history. An interim strategy for player i with neighborhood N i is a function i;N i that assigns to each history in H i;N i an action in fC; Dg. The set of interim strategies of player i is i;N i . A strategy i of player i is a collection of interim strategies f i;M g M N nfig .
Players discount the future with a common factor 1. To de…ne the payo¤s of the in…nitely repeated game, …x a network G. Given a pro…le of strategies N = ( 1 ; 2 ; ::; n ), let fa 
where ( ) denotes the Banach-Mazur limit of a sequence. If`1 denotes the set of bounded sequences of real numbers, a Banach-Mazur limit is a linear functional :`1 ! R such that: (i) (e) = 1 if e = f1; 1; :::g; (ii) (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::) = (x 2 ; x 3 ; :::) for any sequence
2`1 (see [4] ). It can be shown that, for any sequence fx t g 1 t=0 2`1,
Remark 1 For simplicity, we will restrict players to use pure strategies. Since player i's beliefs assign positive probability to a …nite number of paths for any history in H i;N i , linearity ensures that the expectation of the Banach-Mazur limit is the same as the BanachMazur limit of the expectation. Our analysis can be extended to mixed strategies with in…nite supports by using special Banach-Mazur limits, called medial limits, which can be shown to exists under the continuum hypothesis (see [1] ).
De…ne the set of histories for the entire game to be
Given a history h 2 H, the realization of an information network G, and a pro…le of strategies N = ( 1 ; 2 ; ::; n ), de…ne the pro…le
; ::; h n;Nn ) induced by the history h and information network G in the standard way. A pair (G; h) will be referred to as a node of the dynamic game. 3 A pair (N i ; h i ) of a neighborhood and an observed history (or simply an observed history h i as its components identify the neighbors of player i) is associated uniquely with information set I (h i ) and viceversa. 4 With some abuse of notation, we will sometimes use h i to denote I (h i ).
A system of beliefs de…nes at each information set I (h i ) of player i the conditional probability (G; hjh i ) of each node (G; h) 2 I (h i ). The marginal belief of a network G is denoted by (Gjh i ) and of a history h by (hjh i ).
Equilibrium Properties
In this section, we de…ne three properties of strategies. The …rst requires a strategy pro…le to be a sequential equilibrium that is invariant with respect to any prior beliefs in a subset of admissible beliefs.
De…nition ( Invariant Equilibrium --IE): A strategy pro…le is a -invariant equilibrium,
A , if it is a sequential equilibrium for any prior beliefs in .
As strategies depend on the observed neighborhood, -invariance requires that the players' behavior is not a¤ected by conditional beliefs about remote parts of the network derived from priors in . Naturally, the scope of this requirement depends on the choice of possible beliefs. Within the con…nes of such choice, invariance implies that local responsiveness su¢ ces for sequential rationality and equilibrium behavior. Relatedly, -invariance also implies that prior beliefs need not be common, in so far as they belong to the set . All the equilibrium constructions presented in the paper will satisfy some form of invariance. We highlight this property in our analysis as it establishes that e¢ cient behavior need not be …ne-tuned to the exact beliefs about the global monitoring structure: the network structure itself is immaterial in that only local information matters for the determination of a player's incentives.
The second property is straightforward and selects strategies in which every player cooperates for any information network.
De…nition (Collusive -C):
A strategy pro…le is collusive if the sequence of stage-game actions generated for any information network is such that the players play C in every period.
The …nal property characterizes the robustness of an equilibrium to occasional defections by players. This de…nition is similar to, yet marginally stronger than, the notion of global stability de…ned in Kandori (1992) .
De…nition ( Stability --S):
A strategy pro…le satis…es -stability, A , if for any information network G such that f (G) > 0 for some f 2 and any history h 2 H, there exists a period T h G such that all the players play C in all periods greater than T h G .
We deem equilibria satisfying -stability of interest as cooperation will always resume after any number of mistakes.
The main results of this paper establish the existence of collusive strategy pro…les that are -invariant equilibria for various choices of , with -stability sometimes playing a role in the equilibrium construction. Several additional robustness properties will be discussed after each result. Obviously, the main hurdles are brought about by the restriction that a player's action applies to indiscriminately to his entire neighborhood. If players could choose a di¤erent action for each relationship, standard results would yield a Folk Theorem.
Patient Players
In this section, we show that when short-term incentives are inessential, as the players' payo¤s equal the long-term average, cooperation can be achieved via a simple strategy pro…le that satis…es A -invariance and A -stability. In this pro…le, cooperation is "balanced": as the game unfolds from any history, in each relationship a player will have defected for the same number of periods as his opponent, before reverting to permanent cooperation.
This case is obviously of interest in and of itself when long-run payo¤s are the sole players' motive in the strategic interaction. More importantly, it brings into focus two considerations. First, retaliatory punishments that are balanced, although propagating through the information network, always extinguish themselves in aggregate either by reaching a player with only one neighbor or by neutralizing themselves when reaching a player simultaneously from di¤erent directions. Second, such retaliatory behavior can be made consistent with sequential rationality because of the irrelevance of short-term incentives. If in each relationship a player will have ultimately defected for the same number of periods as his opponent, there does not exist a …nite bound that applies to all histories on the number of the defections that a player expects from his opponent. Thus, there may not be a discount rate su¢ ciently large to neutralize short term incentives after any history. As we shall see in the next section, when the discount factor is less than unity, we induce short-term incentive compatibility by abandoning balanced retaliations and bounding punishments at the expense of A -stability.
To formulate the equilibrium strategies, …rst de…ne a pair of state variables 
This interim strategy instructs each player i to defect if and only if at least one of his "required"number of defections d ij is positive. The strategy i of player i is the collection interim strategies f i;M g M N nfig . A pro…le of such strategies will be denoted by N . Note that, if d ij > d ji , the states return to (0; 0) after d ji periods of (D; D) and d ij d ji periods of (D; C). Hence, d ij may be interpreted as the number of defections that players i and j require from player i in the future to return to the initial state. The next theorem shows that such a strategy pro…le satis…es the three properties of Section 2.3. Figure 1 . A deviation of player 1 spreads along the cycle and is stopped by the simultaneous play of D by players 3 and 4. Consider now the hexagon. Defections stop spreading because they reach player 4 simultaneously. Note how the play of D which originates from player 1, moves away from player 1 in both directions. That is, player 1 is a "source" of D's. In the pentagon, after players 2 and 5 play D, the play of D moves way from these players as well, that is, players 2 and 5 become sources. Our proof strategy generalizes this observation: there always exists a source player and the set of source players expands. Figure 2 provides additional intuition about the "annihilation" of D's that occurs when players conform to the pro…le N . Note that the graph has two cycles. Consider a history of length 10 in which player 1 deviates in the …rst period only, player 2 does not respond and does play C for the …rst 10 periods, and all other players always conform to the pro…le N . The …rst plot of Figure 2 , depicts the state of play at the beginning of period 10 when player 2 plays his …nal deviation to C. By period Second, the retaliatory nature of the pro…le N is such that, in any relationship, a play of (D; C) is always matched by a later play of (C; D). Hence, a payo¤ of 1 + g is followed by a payo¤ of l. As we shall see, this is the reason why A1 and A -stability guarantee that, after any history, conforming to the pro…le N yields an average payo¤ at least as large as the average payo¤ from any deviation.
We …rst establish that the strategy pro…le N satis…es A -stability. For any history h 2 H, de…ne the "excess defection" in a relationship to be
Fix an information network G and, for any history h 2 H and any path = (j 1 ; ::; ; j m ), de…ne
to be the sum of the excess defections along the path. Let P if be the set of paths with initial vertex i and terminal vertex f and P ii the set of cycles with initial vertex i. Finally, let S(h) denote the set of players such that the aggregate excess defection on any path departing from them is non-positive, that is,
Such players can be interpreted as the sources of D's in the network in that defections travel away from players in S(h). The next lemma shows that aggregate excess defections along paths depend only on the initial and terminal vertices and that S(h) is non-empty for any history h. Let the function I ( ) denote the indicator function.
Lemma 2 Consider an information network G. For any history (h; a) 2 H in which a history h 2 H is followed by stage-game action pro…le a 2 A N :
The next result uses Lemma 2 to establish that the strategy pro…le N satis…es Astability. The main idea of the proof is that the set S (h) expands when players play according to the strategy pro…le N . The intuition follows by observing that …rst, when deviations "travel away"from a player i 2 S (h), (d ij ; d ji ), j 2 N i , declines, and second, if a player i is in S (h) and has a neighbor j such that (d ij (h) ; d ji (h)) = (0; 0), then player j is also in S (h).
Lemma 3
The strategy pro…le N satis…es A -S.
We will use Lemmas 2 and 3 to prove Theorem 1. The intuition for the …nal leg of this result follows from the pro…le N being such that, in any relationship, the outcome (D; C) is always matched by the outcome (C; D). The di¢ culty consists in evaluating the payo¤ of sequences for which no limit exists and in which deviations occur an in…nite number of times, as the one shot deviation principle is inapplicable. Too see how these complications are resolved consider any history. The strategy N speci…es a future play for the remainder of the game that leads to cooperation within …nite time. Moreover, within any …nite horizon, the number of periods in which a player can gain g in any relationship by deviating from N can be larger than the number of period in which he will incurs l by at most one. This follows as any deviation to defection is always met by an immediate defection and as cooperation is restored only after the deviating player has incurred l. Then, as a direct consequence of A1, a player cannot strictly gain from deviating as the time horizon grows large. Indeed, an in…nite number of deviations brings the payo¤ strictly below the cooperative payo¤.
Proof of Theorem 1. The pro…le N trivially satis…es C. We will now show that, for any history h 2 H,
for any interim strategy i 2 i;N i , any G 2 (N i ), and any i 2 N . One can easily verify that -IE then follows.
Consider any history h 2 H of length z 1. Notice that by A -S, (ii) in the de…nition of Banach-Mazur limits, and linearity
Hence, N is A -IE if and only if for any player i 2 N and for any interim strategy
Let fa t N g 1 t=z be the sequence of stage-game actions generated by ( i ; h i;G ) after history h when the information network is G. De…ne h t , t z 1, to be the history of length t generated by the strategy pro…le ( i ; h i;G ) after history h, that is, h z 1 = h and, for any t z, h t+1 = (h t ; a t+1 N ). Consider any relationship ij 2 G. Omitting some dependent variables for notational convenience, de…ne a variable which counts how many times an action pro…le (a i ; a j ) has been played by the pair ij between periods s and s+T in history
Then, from 
T . It follows that the payo¤ of player i in relationship ij must satisfy
and that, by A1, 1 + g l < 2. Then, since
Therefore, the Banach-Mazur limit satis…es
The claim follows as Banach Mazur limits are linear.
Comments
Theorem 1 applies to several extensions of the baseline model. First, it is trivially robust to uncertainty on the number of players. Second, payo¤s can be heterogeneous and allowed to depend on each relationship as long as A1 holds in all relationships. Indeed, Theorem 1 works even if payo¤s are private information as long as they satisfy A1 in all possible realizations. Second, nowhere in the proof of Theorem 1 was it assumed that ij > 0 for any ij 2 G. Indeed, the arguments hold when ij = 0 for some ij 2 G. Thus, this result extend to the case in which the set of players observed by another player is larger than the set of players that a¤ect this player's payo¤.
We allow a pair (d ij ; d ji ) to grow unbounded to prevent D's from cycling around the graph. Intuitively, suppose that ij is a relationship on a cycle. If player i fails to respond once to a play of (C; D) in relationship ij, D propagates only in one direction and enter a cycle. To "extinguish" this D, player i must play D so that D travels in the opposite direction as well. Although the network is …nite, local information prevents the players from …nding the smallest number of "counterbalancing" D's that prevent periodicity of punishments. As strategies only rely on local information, all D's propagating in one direction must be o¤set by the same number of D's in the opposite direction.
Impatient Players
This section studies games with players having discount factors below one. The …rst subsection introduces strategies and proves some preliminary results. The strategies constructed here are variants of the strategy discussed in Section 3. Punishments remain contagious and spread through the information network, but the maximal number of defections expected by any neighbor is bounded. Thus, retaliations are no longer balanced in the sense discussed in the previous section. To see why the pro…le N needs to be modi…ed when the discount factors are below one, suppose that the information network is a large star network. Take a history of length T in which one peripheral player has always played D and the remaining players always C. It straightforward to check that, the longer T , the larger must be for the central player to comply with N and that no lower bound smaller than one exists for such .
Since retaliations are not balanced, inducing incentive compatibility runs into the problem that defections can cycle. In particular, players may expect defections to reach them in the future even when cooperation has resumed in each of their relationships. Checking sequential rationality in such cases is extremely demanding. It is possible to circumvent this di¢ culty with a rather direct approach that restricts the set of information networks. This section shows how to extend such an approach to our general framework. In appendix 5.1, we prove that, if priors assign positive probability only to acyclic information networks, a simple -invariant equilibrium exists that satis…es C and -stability. This result is a stepping stone for the main theorem presented here, which establishes that, if prior beliefs have full support, the very same strategy pro…le satis…es sequential rationality for an appropriate selection of a consistent system of beliefs. Numerous robustness properties of these bounded-punishment strategies are discussed after the main result.
Strategies and Preliminary Results
This subsection introduces the strategy pro…le N that di¤ers from the one in Section 3 in that the maximal number of defections expected from any player is bounded by 2. As before, two state variables (d ij ; d ji ) characterize the state of each relationship ij 2 G and require each player i to defect if and only if at least one of his "required"number of 
where d ij , again, denotes the change in variable d ij and the + sign a strictly positive value.
Case l = 0 : Choose either transition rule.
We denote a pro…le of such strategies by N . 5 To achieve incentive compatibility 5 We omit the dependence on parameter l for simplicity.
at every information set, (d ij ; d ji ) is bounded by (2; 2) in all cases. Note that, when the stage game is the prisoner's dilemma, equilibrium punishments following a deviation from the e¢ cient play last for two periods. To see why, consider a player who needs to punish the opponent in one relationship but to cooperate in a second relationship in which his opponent's is expected to play D. If this player delays the punishment in the …rst relationship by one period, and thus temporarily restores cooperation in the second, he will have to defect in next period to restore cooperation in the …rst. Such action will then be a new deviation in the second relationship and thus trigger a two-period punishment. One can easily see that if a one-period punishment was instead triggered, delaying the punishment by one period in the …rst relationship can yield a higher payo¤ in the second when 1 + g l > 0.
The following result is instrumental to the proof of the main theorems of this section. It provides su¢ cient conditions for player i never to expect his neighbors to play D because of the past play in relationships to which player i does not belong. These conditions are: (i) all deviations have occurred in player i's neighborhood; (ii) no two neighbors of player i are connected by a path. Given a history h 2 H of length T and a network G, let D (G; h; t) denote the set of players who deviate from the strategy pro…le N in period t T . Further, de…ne
Again, let d ij (h) be the value of d ij following history h. A component of an undirected graph is a maximal subgraph in which any two vertices are connected to each other by a path. A relationship ij 2 G is a bridge in G if its deletion from G increases the number of components.
Lemma 4 Consider a network G, a player i 2 N , and a history h 2 H such that:
(ii) If j 2 D (G; h) nfig, the relationship ij is a bridge in G.
Then, d jk (h) = 0 for any j 2 N i and k 2 N j nfig.
The proof proceeds by induction. It shows that if all deviations have occurred in player i's neighborhood, and if there is no cycle that includes player i and his deviating neighbors, then player i never expects anyone of his neighbors to defect in response to behavior outside their relationship, regardless of his actions. Intuitively, since defections spread outwards in the information network, they can only return to player i if there is a cycle connecting i to a deviating player.
Full Support
This section establishes that the strategy pro…le N is a -invariant equilibrium satisfying C whenever prior beliefs have full support. Some of arguments developed here rely on the analysis of acyclic networks which appears in appendix 4.1. Let F S be the set of prior beliefs having full support, that is, if f 2 F S then f (G) > 0 for any G. The main idea of the proof consists in constructing a consistent system of beliefs such that all deviations are "local"and do not spread. That is, beliefs will be such that, following a deviation by a neighbor, a player believes that this neighbor is isolated. Naturally, the assumption of full support is crucial for this task. The perturbations of the equilibrium strategies needed in the construction of our consistent system of beliefs are chosen to converge pointwise to the equilibrium strategy. Fix a player i with a neighborhood N i . Let G i denote the network in which N j = fig for any player j 2 N i , and
That is, G i consists of an incomplete star network, in which player i is the center and the players in N i are the periphery, and a disjoint, totally connected component. 6 Consider the strategy N .
Given a history h i observed by player i when i's neighborhood is N i , let h (h i ) be the history such that (G i ; h (h i )) 2 I (h i ) and every player j = 2 N i [ fig plays according to N (i.e. plays C) in every period. Hence, at the node (G i ; h (h i )) all deviations are local in that they have occurred only in player i's relationships. We say that player j 2 N i i-deviates from N at the observed history h i if
that is, if player j does not play according to N on the path to h i when the network is
The next lemma shows that it is possible to construct a consistent belief system such that for any player i: (i) whenever a player j i-deviates, player i believes that player j's neighborhood contains only player i; (ii) player i believes that all deviations occur in his relationships. This is achieved by assuming that trembles are such that a deviation by a player with a singleton neighborhood is in…nitely more likely than a deviation by a player with a larger neighborhood, and such that, as in the proof of Theorem 7, more recent deviations are in…nitely more likely than less recent ones. 
The proof of the main result of this subsection follows from the preceding lemma and Lemma 4.
Theorem 6
If is su¢ ciently close to one, the strategy pro…le N satis…es C and F S -IE.
Proof. The strategy pro…les clearly satisfy C. We now establish F S -IE. In particular it will be shown that given the system of beliefs characterized in Lemma 5, it is sequentially rational to comply with the equilibrium strategy for any pro…le of prior beliefs satisfying A3. Thus, the veri…cation of sequential rationality is identical to the case in which networks are acyclic, and appears in Theorem 7 below. Property F S -IE follows immediately as the strategies are independent of the prior beliefs.
Comments
The strategy pro…le of Theorem 6 is such that all players believe that defections spread away and never return, and that cooperation is restored permanently within two periods. This follows immediately from the above proof noting that no player expects defections to cycle and that the number of defections expected from a player in any of his relationships is bounded by two. Of course, such stability in "belief" may or may not be coexist with the actual systemic robustness of a permanent reversion to cooperation within …nite time. Nevertheless, it does point out that it is possible to construct sequential equilibria in which incentives are always perceived as local. In such equilibria, defections are reactive and never anticipatory, that is, players do not defect in anticipation of forthcoming defections.
Several the robustness properties of the equilibrium strategy of Section 3 are satis…ed by the equilibrium strategy of this section provided that the ordinal properties of the games are the same across all relationships. Uncertainty about the number of players, heterogeneity in payo¤s, and uncertainty about payo¤s consistent with A1 can be allowed for without compromising the results. The equilibrium in this section is also robust to heterogeneity in discount rates. The above theorem can also be extended to the case in which ij = ji = 0 for some ij 2 G. This is again achieved by using the same system of beliefs as in Theorem 6 but modifying the strategies so that d ij = 0 in any relationship ij for which ij = 0, that is, deviations in relationship ij are ignored. The intuition follows from such deviations being irrelevant for the immediate payo¤s and not being expected to return via a di¤erent path.
The assumption of full support can be dispensed with when l > 0 by adapting an argument …rst used by Ellison (1994) . 7 Note that a simple grim trigger strategy sustains cooperation for values of in some interval ; . Then, cooperation can be extended to any 2 = ; 1 by partitioning the game into T 1 independent games played every T periods and by playing according to grim trigger strategies in each of the independent games. The number T is chosen so that implied discount rate T is in ; . The equilibrium pro…le, however, is not robust to heterogeneous stage-game payo¤s and, in particular, to heterogeneous discount rates since all players must partition the repeated game into independent games of identical length. Moreover, a player who defects in one of the T 1 games never returns to cooperation in that game. Play eventually settles on constant defection in the component in which this player resides. Thus, such equilibria never satisfy -stability. The full support assumption is helpful in establishing theorem 6, as it allows su¢ -cient ‡exibility in the determination of appropriate posterior beliefs. In particular, in the proof posterior beliefs are concentrated on networks that never lead to cycles of defections in histories in which deviations were observed. In a network environment, McBride (2006) exploits an analogous ‡exibility in posteriors by adopting the notion of conjectural equilibrium in Gilli (1992) .
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Appendix

Acyclic Networks
In this subsection, we circumvent the problem of cycling defections by restricting the class of information networks. In particular, we prove that, if priors assign positive probability only to acyclic information networks, the pro…le of strategies introduced in section 4.1 is a -invariant equilibrium satisfying C and -stability. That e¢ ciency can be easily obtained with relatively simple strategies in any acyclic network is of interest in cases in which a planner chooses the information network as in Haag and Laguno¤ (2006) . Moreover, this result is a stepping stone for theorem 6 which establishes that, if prior beliefs have full support, the very same strategy pro…le satis…es sequential rationality for an appropriate selection of a consistent system of beliefs. Let N C be the set of admissible beliefs such that if f 2 N C and f (G) > 0, then G is acyclic.
Theorem 7
If is su¢ ciently close to one, the strategy pro…le N satis…es C, N C -IE, and N C -S.
We …rst establish that the equilibrium strategy satis…es N C -stability and then we prove the general theorem.
Lemma 8
The strategy pro…le N satis…es N C -S.
Proof. Suppose that G is a tree and consider any history. For notational simplicity, assume that G is connected. If the players play according to the pro…le N , the possible transitions are given by if l 0
We will prove the claim by induction on the number of players. It is easily veri…ed that N C -stability holds for n = 2. Suppose that n > 2. Consider a relationship ij such that player i is the unique neighbor of player j (player j is a terminal vertex). First note that, if d ij = 0, it will remains so for the remainder of the game. Consequently, if d ij = 0, the relationship ij is super ‡uous for the play of player i as player i plays D if and only if d ik > 0 for some neighbor k 6 = j. Hence, by induction, there exists a period t such that the play of all the players in the network in which the relationship ij is removed is C in all periods greater than t. Obviously, the same will hold for player j for some period t 0 t. Conversely, if d ij > 0, since player j's only neighbor is player i, d ij will become zero after a …nite number of periods and the above argument applies again.
The proof of Theorem 7 exploits N C -stability to establish that the strategy pro…le N is a N C -invariant equilibrium. In the …rst part of the argument, we construct consistent beliefs such that players believe that deviations occur only in their neighborhood. This is achieved by de…ning trembles for which more recent deviations to D are in…nitely more likely than less recent deviations. Such beliefs imply that any player i believes that the action of a neighbor j 2 N i at any history h is determined exclusively by d ji (h). For example, consider the prisoner's dilemma and a linear information network with three players in which player 1 is connected to player 2 who is connected to player 3. If player 1, upon observing a defection believes that it originated with player 3 two period earlier, he expects player 2 to defect twice. If instead he believes that the defection originated with player 2, he expect no further defections. In our construction, consistent beliefs correspond to the latter case. The second part of the argument is a tedious step-by-step veri…cation that sequential rationality holds given such a system of beliefs.
Comments
Acyclic graph allow us to bound punishments since deviations do not cycle even if retaliations are not balanced. Thus, we are able to obtain N C -stability. Furthermore, at any history cooperation is restored after no more than 3n periods. All the robustness properties of the equilibrium strategy of Section 3 are satis…ed by the equilibrium strategy of this section provided that the ordinal properties of the games are the same across all relationships. Uncertainty about the number of players, heterogeneity in payo¤s, and uncertainty about payo¤s consistent with A1 can be allowed for without compromising the results. The equilibrium in this section is also robust to heterogeneity in discount rates. The above theorem can be easily extended to the case in which ij = ji = 0 for some ij 2 G. This is achieved by using the same beliefs as in Theorem 7, but modifying the strategies so that deviations in a relationship ij for which ij = 0 are not punished, that is, d ij = 0. Such deviations are inconsequential for players i and j as they do not a¤ect current payo¤s and never return.
Proof of Theorem 7
We begin with a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 9
If the prior beliefs are in N C , there exists a system of beliefs consistent with strategy pro…le N such that, for any history h i 2 H i;N i observed a player i 2 N , if
Proof. Consider trembles such that (i) a deviation to D by player i in period t when max j d ij = 0 occurs with probability " t , where 1 > n 1 ; (ii) a deviation to C by player i in period t when max j d ij > 0 occurs with probability " 2 . As " ! 0, any …nite number of deviations to D is in…nitely more likely than a single deviation to C and any …nite number of recent deviations to D is in…nitely more likely than one earlier deviation to D. Given the sequence of completely mixed behavior strategy pro…les " N obtained by adding these trembles to the pro…le N , let " (G; h) be the probability of node (G; h).
The strategy " N is such that, for every information set I (h i ) of player i, the conditional belief of node (G; h) 2 I (h i )
Consider an acyclic network G for which f (G) > 0 and a player i and a neighbor j 2 N i . Consider any history h i 2 H i:N i and let h + (h i ) 2 H denote the unique history of play The probability of history h + (h i ) then satis…es
The term
x(") is a product that includes the prior and probabilities of "non-deviations", and y (") a product of the probabilities of deviations to C by players in N i directly observed by
Now consider any other history such that (G; h) 2 I(h i ). Suppose that such a history displays a deviation to C which is not directly observed by player i. Then, by construction
Thus, n 1 < 1 implies that
Consider now a history h 0 in which all deviations to C have been directly observed by player i. Let t denote the …rst period in which d jk (h 0t ) > 0 for some k 2 N j ni. Then,
Since there are only …nitely many histories in I(h i ), it must be that lim "!0
We now return to the proof of the Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 7. Property C is obvious. Tables are added as supplementary material to clarify the evolution of payo¤s within a neighborhood after a defection. To prove N C -IE, consider the system of beliefs as in Lemma 9. Then, for any history In order to check sequential rationality, we need to consider two separate cases. First assume that l 0. Given any history, seven values of (d ij ; d ji ) are possible, namely (0; 0), (1; 0), (0; 1), (1; 1), (0; 2), (2; 0), and (2; 2). First consider the case in which max j2N i d ij (h i ) = 0 and thus i (h i ) = C. If player i is su¢ ciently patient, he prefers to comply with the equilibrium strategy since the payo¤ di¤erences between complying and a one shot deviation to D with any neighbor j 2 N i are
which are positive by A1 and l 0 when is su¢ ciently close to one.
A one shot deviation to C causes the maximum d ij to remain equal to 1 in the next period for some j 2 N i . The payo¤ di¤erences are
As ! 1, the …rst and the last expression converge to zero, while the remaining three expressions become strictly positive. Since max j2N i d ij (h i ) = 1, a neighbor exists with whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when is close to 1. Since ij > 0 for any j 2 N i , a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for close to 1. Finally, suppose that max d ij (h i ) = 2. A one shot deviation to C causes the maximum d ij to remain equal to 2 in the next period for some j 2 N i . The payo¤ di¤erences are
As ! 1 the …rst and the …fth expression converge to zero, while the remaining expressions become strictly positive. Since max j2N i d ij (h i ) = 2, a neighbor exists with whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when is close to 1. Since ij > 0 for any j 2 N i , a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for close to 1.
Next assume that l 0. Given any history, …ve values of (d ij ; d ji ) are possible, namely (0; 0), (1; 0), (0; 1), (1; 1), and (2; 2). First consider the case in which max j2N i d ij (h i ) = 0 and thus i (h i ) = C. If player i is su¢ ciently patient, he prefers to comply with the equilibrium strategy since the payo¤ di¤erences between complying and a one shot deviation to D with any neighbor j 2 N i are
As ! 1, the …rst expression is strictly positive and the second weakly positive by A1 and l 0.
A one shot deviation to C causes the maximum d ij to increase to 2 in the next period for some j 2 N i . The payo¤ di¤erences are
As ! 1, the …rst expression is weakly positive and the remaining expressions become strictly positive, since 1 > g l by A1. Since max j2N i d ij (h i ) = 1, a neighbor exists with whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when is close to 1. Since ij > 0 for any j 2 N i , a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for close to 1. Finally, suppose that max d ij (h i ) = 2. A one shot deviation to C causes the maximum d ij to remain equal to 2 in the next period for some j 2 N i . The payo¤ di¤erences are
As ! 1, the …rst and the second expression converge to zero, while the remaining expressions become strictly positive. Since max j2N i d ij (h i ) = 2, a neighbor exists with whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when is close to 1. Since ij > 0 for any j 2 N i , a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for close to 1.
Since the incentives to conform to N are not a¤ected by the beliefs about the graph, the proof is complete.
Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof …rst establishes (1) and then proceeds by induction to prove (2) and (3). Consider a history (h; a). Notice that, by de…nition, The last equality holds by a simple counting argument. Consider the sequence of action pairs f a j k ; a j k+1 g m 1
k=1
. First remove all the pairs of actions a j k ; a j k+1 for which a j k = a j k+1 since I a j k 6 = a j k+1 = 0. Since the stage game has only two actions, if the actions played at the beginning and at the end of the path coincide (a i = a f ), we are left an even number of alternating pairs. If actions played at the beginning and at the end do not coincide (a i 6 = a f ), we are left an odd number of alternating pairs. The desired equality then follows. Notice that (1) and a simple induction argument imply (2) . When h is empty, (2) holds trivially. If (2) holds for any history h, it will also hold for a history (h; a) since a i = a f in a cycle. A similar induction argument also establishes (3). Claim (4) is also proved by induction. When h is the empty history, d ij (h) = 0 for any ij 2 G, and (4) holds trivially since S(h) = N . Suppose that (4) holds for a history h. Consider the history h 0 = (h; a) and a player i 2 S(h). If i 2 S(h 0 ), the claim holds.
Suppose then that i = 2 S(h 0 ). Since i 2 S(h), by (1) there exists at least one path 2 P ij such that E (h 0 ) = 1. We will show that this implies that j 2 S(h 0 ). Consider any path 0 2 P jf and any path 00 2 P if for any f 2 N . Note that, by (1), E 00 (h 0 ) 1 and, by
:
which establishes (4).
For the proof of (B), take j 2 N i such that i 2 S(h z + ) and j =z 0, any player r 2 N range. For any node (G; h) 2 I (h i ) de…ne (G; hjh i ) = lim "!0 " (G; hjh i ) .
We …rst establish (a). Consider (G; h) 2 I (h i ). Recall that the history h (h i ) is such that (G i ; h (h i )) 2 I (h i ) and every player j = 2 N i [ fig, plays C in every period. Obviously, for any j 2 N i ,
where h i (j), h (h i ; j), and h (j) denote player j's play in histories h i , h (h i ), and h. Now consider a player j 2 N i that i-deviates from N at the observed history h i . That is, j 2 D (G i ; h (h i )). Since at node (G i ; h (h i )) all deviations are of type (i),
where the lower bound is obtained by setting W to be equal to nT , y k = 1 in (5) and noting that P V k=1 z k P T t=1 n t < 1 since 1 n < 1. Thus, for " su¢ ciently close to zero, there exists a constant q > 0 such that " (G i ; h (h i )) q":
The constant q is positive since, by hypothesis, f (G i ) > 0. 1. First suppose that j 2 D (G 0 ; h 0 ). As the deviation of player j at period t is of type (ii), " (G 0 ; h 0 ) " 2 . Thus,
Now consider a node (G
" q which implies that (G 0 ; h 0 jh i ) = 0. Thus, the claim holds. For any t T , let K (t) denote the number of player in D (G 0 ; h 0 ; t). Then
where the upper-bound in the …rst inequality is obtained setting y k = 1, k = 1; :::; W , and x = 1 in (5), and the lower-bound in the second inequality is obtained by setting W = nT and y k = 1 in (5), and noting that
Hence, for some constant q 0 > 0, when " is close to zero,
and thus, (G 0 ; h 0 jh i ) = 0 since 1 n < 1.
This establishes part (a) and implies that, if (G; hjh i ) > 0, player i believes that
To prove (b), observe that (a) implies that we can restrict attention to networks G such that N j = fig for any j 2 D (G i ; h (h i )) nfig. We prove the claim by contradiction. Let t be the earliest period t such that D (G i ; h (h i ) ; t) 6 = D (G; h; t) .
Observe that the same argument as in (a) shows that D (G i ; h (h i ) ; t ) D (G; h; t ) and the claim is proved analogously.
